What it is

Two audit regimes dominate how software companies demonstrate security and operational discipline to customers. ISO/IEC 27001 is an international standard for an information security management system (ISMS): an organisation defines its risk treatment, selects controls — ISO/IEC 27002 is the catalogue most of them come from — and an accredited certification body audits that the system exists and operates, initially and then on a surveillance and recertification cycle. SOC 2 is an attestation framework from the AICPA: an independent service auditor examines a service organisation’s controls against the Trust Services Criteria (security always; availability, processing integrity, confidentiality and privacy optionally) and issues a report — Type I on design at a point in time, Type II on operating effectiveness over a period, typically six to twelve months.

They differ in form — a certificate versus a report, a standard versus criteria — but from an engineering team’s chair they ask the same thing about software development: show us that your change-management, review and release controls operate as described, every period, for any change we pick. That sampling is the part teams underestimate. An auditor does not read your policy and nod. They choose changes from the period and ask for the evidence trail of each: who authored it, who approved it, what tests ran, how it reached production. Evidence that exists for the changes you remember is not evidence that the control operates.

Neither regime is a law. They matter because customers, procurement teams and insurers treat them as the default proof of discipline — and increasingly ask, inside them, how AI-assisted development is controlled.

Who it applies to and when

ISO/IEC 27001 applies to any organisation that chooses to certify its ISMS — SaaS vendors, agencies, enterprises — and, once it holds the certificate, to an annual surveillance cycle with recertification every three years. SOC 2 applies to service organisations whose customers want assurance over the services they rely on; the reporting period is chosen with the auditor and repeats, usually annually. There is no statutory start date — the clock is set by the customer who asks, the contract that requires it or the tender that scores it.

What has changed recently is not the standards but the questions asked under them. Auditors now routinely probe how AI coding tools are governed: whether agent-authored changes are identifiable, whether a human reviews them before release, whether the organisation can say what share of a release an agent wrote. Those questions land in the same change-management and secure-development controls that have always been sampled — the sample just has a new failure mode.

Neither ISO/IEC 27001 nor SOC 2 is part of our regulatory mapping: they are voluntary assurance frameworks, not EU acts. This guide therefore describes the documentation value of a recorded chain in the same vocabulary as our mapping — and says plainly where it stops.

What it asks of your development process

The controls an auditor will sample in a software organisation cluster around a few questions:

  • Change management. Is every change to production authorised, reviewed and tested before release? Can you show it per change, not per policy? In ISO/IEC 27002 this is the change-management control and the secure development lifecycle controls; in SOC 2 it is the change-management criteria under the common criteria.
  • Segregation of duties. Did someone other than the author approve the change? With AI agents in the loop this becomes: did a human approve what the agent wrote — and can the record tell the two apart?
  • Secure development. Is there a defined process — code review, testing, dependency handling — and does the evidence show it running?
  • Release and deployment. Can you tie a production release to the set of changes it contained and the checks those changes passed?
  • Integrity of the evidence itself. Can the auditor rely on the records, or could they have been edited after the fact? Ticketing systems and spreadsheets are accepted every day, but an auditor will weigh a record they can independently verify more heavily than one they must take on trust.

What distinguishes a smooth audit from a painful one is rarely the existence of a process. It is whether the process leaves sampled-ready evidence as a by-product: contemporaneous (recorded when the change happened), attributable (author and approver named, human or agent), linked (change → review → tests → release) and tamper-evident. Teams without that assemble evidence packs in the audit week, from memory and from five tools, and discover the gaps under the auditor’s eye.

For AI-assisted teams the sharpest gap is attribution. “All changes are reviewed” is a policy statement; the sample needs to show, for an agent-authored change, the agent that wrote it and the person who approved it. Records that carry only a human committer name — because the agent worked in a human’s session — cannot show that, and an auditor probing AI governance will notice.

What OLOBOLO evidence supports

OLOBOLO records each change with its author (human or agent, with tool and model for agents), the review decision, the test evidence and the release it shipped in — in an append-only, hash-chained record with external RFC 3161 time anchors, exportable as a canonical file that an open-source verifier checks without trusting us. The table uses our mapping vocabulary; this is not a regulatory mapping — ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 are assurance frameworks, and which controls a given sample satisfies is the auditor’s judgement.

Audit question What you need to show Chain evidence Support
Change management — every production change authorised, reviewed, tested Per-change trail: authorship, approval, test linkage, release change.authoredchange.reviewedtest.evidencedrelease.sealed, exportable per repo and per period Supports
Segregation of duties, incl. human review of agent output Approver is not the author; agent-authored changes carry a human review Actor type and identity on change.authored; reviewer identity and decision on change.reviewed Supports
Secure development lifecycle operates Evidence the defined process ran, release by release Release evidence report (counts, coverage, AI share, review coverage) per sealed release Partially supports
Evidence integrity Records could not have been altered after the fact Hash chain + RFC 3161 anchors; independent verification with the open-source verifier Supports
ISMS scope, risk assessment, policies, access control, incident management, availability Organisational and operational controls Out of scope

“Partially supports” on the lifecycle line is deliberate: the chain shows that reviews and tests happened and how much of a release they covered; it does not judge whether your process design meets the standard. And the last line is most of an ISMS or a SOC 2 report — the chain is one evidence source for a handful of controls, not a management system.

Evidence, not a legal opinion: this maps what the chain supports as documentation — your auditor decides what the controls require.

How to start

  1. Record before the period starts. A Type II period or a certification cycle is sampled end to end; evidence that begins in month four is a finding. Install the recorder on in-scope repositories and let the period open with the record already running.
  2. Make approvals and tests explicit. Ensure every merge carries a human review that lands as change.reviewed, and that CI records test.evidenced — the two entries an auditor will ask for next to any sampled change.
  3. Seal releases. Each release.sealed segment and its evidence report are the “what did release X contain and pass” answer, ready before the auditor asks.
  4. Hand the auditor the export and the verifier. Let them inspect the canonical export for the period and run the verifier themselves; the less they must trust you, the smoother the sample.